ABSTRACT: Faculty, staff, and graduate students in a number of departments, students in an undergraduate course, and some groups outside the university were polled to obtain their perceptions about whether domestic animals have minds, the ability to think, and differing degrees of intelligence (the surveys focused only on horses, cows, sheep, dogs, chickens, pigs, cats, and turkeys). A clear majority of all groups surveyed (except the Department of Zoology) said yes, they believe animals have minds, but a substantial number of those in animal sciences and zoology (17 to 25%) said no. A number of others in animal sciences, zoology, and philosophy (11 to 37%) refused to answer the question because the concept of mind was not defined. From 80 to 100% of respondents in other groups said yes to the question of minds. From 67 to 100% of all participants said yes, they perceive that animals have the ability to think, but a substantial number of animal scientists, zoologists, veterinarians, and English faculty said no, animals don't think ( 6 to 33%). On the question Do domestic animals differ in relative intelligence?, the responses varied from 88% in animal sciences to 100%. Surprisingly, when asked to rank different animal species by intelligence, there was a remarkable degree of similarity across all groups regardless of background; the overall ranking from highest intelligence to lowest was dog, cat, pig, horse, cow, sheep, chicken, and turkey. Most of the respondents believed that the possession of minds, thought, and intelligence were relevant factors in how animals should be treated and the prevalent concept was that we should not be cruel to animals, but should treat them humanely.
Introduction
Over 100 yr ago, Darwin said, "Animal minds differ from human minds only in degree, not in kind" (Rachels, 1990) . In other words, Darwin's theory of evolution clearly implied that all animals, including humans, have evolved from ancestors in both physical and mental forms. The majority of people today have accepted Darwin's theory of evolution, at least when it comes to evolution of the physical form, but what about the mental form? Rollin (1990) believes that even biological scientists today don't believe that animals have minds. In his essay titled "How Animals Lost Their Minds," he said:
Talk of animal thought and feeling had gone the way (by the 1930's) of life force, entelechies, essences, absolute space, or spirits-banished from the legitimate purview of scientific inquiry. The persistence of this legacy continues even today-one must still search extensively if one wishes to find a respectable scientist willing to echo Darwin's unequivocal statement [as quoted above] .
Is this true? Is Rollin right when he claims that scientists don't give much credibility to the idea of animals having minds? Do scientists today still believe in the model proposed by Descartes centuries ago that animals are nothing more than biologically programmed machines? We believe that the answer to these questions is no, but that perception is not based on scientific study; rather, it is based on our own perceptions. So this study was conducted to assess the perceptions of people from several groups about the mental capacities of domesticated animals. The groups participating in the study were selected based on their ready availability, not because they represent more comprehensive populations of scientists, professors, or the general public. Therefore, they are limited in sample size and representational scope. The study is not intended as a measurement of public opinion. Our results are offered as a way to frame the discussion on animal minds. The objectives of the study were 1 ) to survey and compare a variety of individuals (scientists and non-scientists) about their perceptions on animal minds, animal thinking, and intelligence as they pertain to domestic animals; 2 ) to determine whether there are differences between biological scientists and social scientists in their perceptions; and 3 ) to determine whether individuals believe that the possession of minds, thinking, and intelligence has any bearing on our responsibilities toward how animals are treated.
Materials and Methods
The survey included a statement of confidentiality as follows:
Dear Respondent, We are interested in obtaining perceptions from biological scientists and non-scientists at Oregon State University about the subject of animal minds and animal thinking. The attached questionnaire asks for your perceptions about these attributes in farm animals and, therefore, we have not provided any definitions to these terms. The answers you provide will be strictly confidential, so we ask that you not put your name or other indicators of identity on the form. Thanks. ** For the discussion of results, we have used the terms "mental capacity" and "intelligence" interchangeably.
The survey was conducted in the Departments of Animal Sciences ( ANS) , Zoology ( ZOOL) , English ( ENG) , Philosophy ( PHL) , and the College of Veterinary Medicine ( CVM) at Oregon State University. It was sent to faculty, staff, and graduate students in each of the programs. In addition, several other groups of individuals were asked to complete the survey. These included the following: 
Results and Discussion
There were apparent differences among groups in the proportion of faculty answering yes to the question of animal minds, as few as 38% of ZOOL faculty and as many as 100% in some other groups (Table 1) .
Interestingly, the CVM faculty responded to this question more similarly to the non-biological scientists and other groups, among which 83 (PHL) to 100% of the respondents perceived that animals do possess minds. The ANS faculty seemed to differ from the ANS graduate students and ANS undergraduate majors; 66, 100, and 97%, respectively, answered yes to this question. A similar percentage of ANS faculty, ZOOL faculty, and ZOOL graduate students answered no to this question. A substantial number of individuals in ANS faculty, ZOOL faculty, and graduate students and PHL faculty declined to answer this question because the survey did not define (deliberately) what we meant by the word "mind." It is our interpretation from these results that our hypothesis is correct that the majority of those surveyed (including scientists) perceive that animals have minds, but there seems to be a substantial difference between some of the groups on this question.
The reasons why some people chose not to answer the question are likely related to the following quote from Griffen (1992) in his book titled Animal Minds:
Many scientists feel that terms such as mind or consciousness are too vague or slippery to be useful in scientific investigation; and they often argue that these and other words describing subjective mental experiences cannot be defined with sufficient precision to allow objective testing of the presence or absence of whatever they designate.
Or, putting it more succinctly, some faculty wrote "what do you mean by a mind?" What is the relevance of possessing a mind to our (humans') responsibility toward the treatment of domestic animals? In Table 2 , we find that the majority of ANS, ZOOL, CVM, OAALAS, ANS students, AG students, and SCI students interpreted this to mean that humans must treat animals humanely and not be cruel to them. However, a relatively large percentage of individuals in these same groups believe that, because animals have minds, our management practices should be changed to better suit the needs of the animal species in question. In all other groups ([ENG, PHL, Confluences [CON] , and other students), the majority of people believed that the possession of a mind means that the management (production) systems should be designed to allow the animals to exhibit their species-specific needs and(or) behaviors. A smaller percentage equated animal minds with animal rights, that humans shouldn't kill these animals for food.
Do animals have the ability to think? Clearly the majority of respondents (lowest was 67%) said yes they believed or perceived that animals can think (Table 3) . Those groups with the lowest percentage were ANS faculty, ZOOL faculty and graduate students, and ENG. It is curious that the ENG faculty were the lowest percentage (67%) who said yes, but 100% of ENG faculty said that they believe that animals have minds. Those groups affiliated with the animal sciences (ANS faculty, ZOOL faculty, CVM, OAALAS, and ANS majors) were about the same in the percentage of people who said that animals don't think. It is also noteworthy that the same percentage of ANS and ZOOL faculty said that animals don't have minds and that animals don't have the ability to think. Are the same individuals answering no to both questions?
Does an animal's ability to think have anything to do with our responsibilities to them? The comments from ANS, ZOOL, OAALAS, ANS students, and SCI students were predominantly (54 to 71%) of the traditional ethic type (treat humanely, don't be cruel to them) ( Table 4) . On the other hand, the comments from CVM, ENG, PHL, CON, and other students were predominantly of Rollin's (1995) "new social ethic" type, meaning that husbandry practices should be designed to accommodate the animals' behavioral needs. We interpret these results to suggest that most of the individuals in the first group are satisfied that current animal production systems are adequate to provide humane treatment to animals, and those in the latter group have significant concerns about how thinking animals are treated in modern animal agriculture. Furthermore, we would speculate that U.S. consumers would be more likely to agree with those of the latter group. If that speculation is true, then perhaps animal scientists and producers need to rethink their approaches toward contemporary animal husbandry practices. Do different animal species have different mental capacities? By far the majority of respondents in all groups surveyed said yes to this question (Table 5 ). The lowest proportion was 88% in the ANS group; 6% of these faculty said no, and another 6% of them declined to answer the question because "there is probably little difference in intelligence among these species." The response from ZOOL faculty and grads was identical: 88% of both said yes and 12% of both refused to answer the question. Perhaps the most interesting observation on this question is the remarkable similarity in people's perceptions of relative intelligence in the species from all groups. Regardless of people's backgrounds, animals were ranked very similarly in intelligence, with dog at the top of the scale and chicken and turkey at the bottom (Table 6 ). The animals fell essentially into two groups. The top group in all cases (but one) included dog, cat, pig, and horse, and the bottom group included cow, sheep, chicken, and turkey. This similarity in ranking may suggest that, in the United States at least, our lifetime experiences lead us to the same perceptions about intelligence of farm animals. In other words, our books, teachers, entertainment, and so on portray dogs as having the highest intelligence and turkeys as having the lowest. One other possibility is that, because most of us have personal experience with dogs, cats, and horses, and few of us have first-hand experience with cows, sheep, chickens, and turkeys, we're more likely to put dogs, cats, and horses at the top of the intelligence scale. But that still wouldn't explain why pigs were rated so highly. Another observation is that the top group (with the interesting exception of pigs) is composed of nonfood species (in the United States). Are they non-food species in the United States because we think they are highly intelligent? If so, why are pigs in this group? Perhaps it is because movies such as Charlotte's Web and Babe have left a trace on the human mind, resulting in the perception that pigs are more highly intelligent than other species produced for food.
If some animals are more intelligent than others, does that difference have any bearing on our responsibilities to them? At the beginning of the study, we would have predicted that the majority of the respondents would say yes to this question. We were wrong. The results don't support that hypothesis (Table 7) . Although a small majority of ANS faculty, CON participants, OAALAS members, and ANS students said yes, the others (ZOOL, CVM, ENG, AG students, and SCI students) said no. At first, this conflicting result was puzzling, until we analyzed the written comments about this question (Table 8 ). It would seem that those who answered yes to this question were thinking either that the more intelligent ones would need more husbandry care; otherwise they might get bored, and develop bad habits that might have negative consequences on their performance. Or, they thought that we needed to be more vigilant with the less intelligent; otherwise they may hurt or kill themselves. Those who answered no to this question were thinking that we need to take good (humane, and appropriate to species) care, regardless how intelligent they may be. Perhaps we could have received a clearer answer on this question had it been written more clearly and concisely. a ANS = animal science; ZOOL = zoology; CVM = College of Veterinary Medicine; ENG = English; PHL = philosophy; OAALAS = American Association of Laboratory Animal Scientists; AG = other agricultural science; SCI = science, engineering, home economics; Other majors = business, liberal arts, etc. b 1 represents the answer "No, it doesn't make any difference. We must treat them humanely regardless of their level of intelligence"; 2 represents "Yes. The smarter ones need better care to prevent boredom"; 3 represents "Yes, the less intelligent ones need better care to ensure they don't hurt themselves"; and 4 represents the animal rights view, "We shouldn't be using them in the first place." All of this so far has been about people's "perceptions" about animal minds, and mental capabilities. And these perceptions are predominantly in the affirmative. What are others saying about these concepts? Does their work agree with or differ from our perceptions? It should be noted that the questions, as posed in this survey study, are very simple questions about very complex phenomena. In fact, several of the respondents stated that these were complex issues and, therefore, refused to answer oversimplified questions about them. Nevertheless, numerous other individuals (scientists, lay people, and philosophers) in recent years have written considerably on this subject (Griffin, 1981 (Griffin, , 1984 (Griffin, , 1992 Rollin, 1989 Rollin, , 1990 Rollin, , 1995 Dupre, 1990; Fox, 1990; Rachels, 1990; Dawkins, 1993; Gould and Gould, 1994) . One of the most influential contemporary behaviorists who speaks in favor of animal minds is Donald Griffin, who argues that consciousness is an evolved ability (1984) , and that it is "conceited" to think that human minds are "divorced from the animal kingdom." Similarly, in a philosophical discussion on the subject, Dupre (1990) said: the suggestion that no nonhuman animal is conscious, sensate, moderately intelligent or in possession of even the simplest of beliefs can . . . be founded only on serious misunderstandings of what is involved in the application of mental descriptions. Thus, I want to conclude that there should be no difficulty in deciding that many other kinds of animals have minds.
In a recent book, Dawkins (1993) discusses numerous studies that she believes support the notion that animals are conscious beings (thinking, feeling, and aware). These studies include the demonstration that sparrows are able to assess a situation involving food and potential predators, make decisions and judgments about the situation, and then choose whether to obtain the food for themselves or call for others to join in. From another study, she describes how wild rats may detect the presence of poisonous food, avoid it, and communicate what they learned to others. She concludes by saying, "Scientific evidence as well as common sense now demand that we take the step of inferring consciousness in species other than our own."
According to Dawkins, if the definition of thinking is "having an internal representation of the external world," then the examples she discusses in her book support the notion that animals have the ability to think. But she goes even further. "Thinking is, however, but one facet of 'mind.' The other, considered by many to be the more basic and morally the more important aspect of consciousness, is the capacity for subjective feelings-for experiencing states such as 'anger,' 'pain,' 'pleasure,' and so on." It is this aspect of "mind" that is most worrisome to most people because it is central to how animals should be treated. She says, "In order to know how to treat animals, we need to know not just whether they are capable of intellectualizing about their world, but what they feel." This, of course, is the central point underlying the animal rights philosophies: the concept of sentience (Singer, 1990 .) Singer (and others) begin with the assumption that all mammals (at least) are sentient beings and, therefore, their sentience is a morally relevant factor.
If we were to have included another question in this survey, Do animals have feelings (pain and pleasure) and emotions (fear, anger, love) , what would people say? We will have to ask the question to find out, but our hypothesis is that a majority would say yes.
Is all this discussion of animal mental attributes just so much anthropomorphising on our part? Can we simply dismiss serious consideration of these issues by calling such thoughts anthropomorphic? Perhaps, but to do so would probably sell them, and ourselves, short if we do stop there. Perhaps it is inevitable, in discussing animal mental states and capabilities, to do so anthropomorphically, because we have to use our own language and thought to do so. But does that necessarily make the conclusions wrong? Fox (1990) goes on to say, "There is sufficient documented evidence from stress research, animal psychology, and neurophysiology to support the probability that the subjective emotional world of animals is more similar to the various subjective states of human consciousness than it is different." Fox (1990) further suggests that it is only through "anthropomorphic correlation of empirically derived observations . . . that are seen in humans in association with subjective emotional states such as fear and anxiety" that we can begin to understand what is in animal consciousness and minds. Furthermore, we extrapolate biochemical, physiological, nutritional, and even some behavioral responses in animals to humans all the time in biomedical research. Is it not, therefore, possible to extrapolate the other way?
From a neuroanatomical perspective as well, there is evidence supporting the concept of animal minds, and thought. In his 1981 book, Griffin states that "mental experiences are also held by behaviorists to be identical with neurophysiological processes. Neurophysiologists have so far discovered no fundamental differences between the structure or function of neurons and synapses in man and other animals." Such concepts again refer to Darwin's view of the continuity of the evolution of physical and mental states in humans as well as nonhuman animals (Rachels, 1990) .
Finally, a few comments about relative intelligence of domesticated animals. In this report, we observed that dogs, cats, sheep, chickens, and so on, are perceived by humans to be of different levels of intelligence, that dogs are smarter than the other species discussed here. But is that perception based on facts or is it based on some past anthropomorphic shaping of our thoughts? It could well be argued that 1 ) there is no single "IQ" test that can be used to adequately compare relative intelligence in these species, and 2 ) the species discussed here may be sufficiently similar in intellectual capacities that it is meaningless to try to suggest a difference. Thomas (1986) writes on this subject that there is insufficient information to draw conclusions about relative intelligence of animals. Furthermore, "It is best to avoid debates such as the comparative intelligence of the horse versus the pig, or whether your neighbors' cat is smarter than your dog. The answers simply have not yet been found." Despite that statement, there are those who have used various data and conclude that there are differences in intelligence. Jensen (1980) says that mammals are more intelligent than birds, reptiles, amphibians, and fish. And he says that among the mammals, he ranks them (from highest to lowest) as human, other primate, dog, cat, elephant, pig, horse, cow, and rodent. This ranking would agree well with the perceptions of individuals involved in our survey. His rankings are the results of numerous studies and papers, including that by Warden (1951) . In this paper, Warden discusses the evolution of intelligence and ranks species in the order primates, dog, cat, elephant, pig, horse, bird, reptiles, amphibians, fishes. However, it is not possible to judge from this paper the quality of the data on which this ranking is based. Banks and Flora (1977) reported that college students ranked the comparative intelligence of a variety of animals as follows (where 1 = lowest and 10 = highest): apes, 9.2; dogs, 7.4; cats, 6.6; horses, 5.6; cows, 3.6; sheep, 3.4; chickens, 3.4; and fish, 1.7. This ranking (as quoted in Pearce, 1987) is essentially identical to the results of the present survey and suggest that Americans not only have been taught such a concept, but that it is still prevalent today. These perceptions likely are based on a phylogenetic scale suggested (concluded) at least decades ago with primates at the top, followed by dog, cat, elephant, pig, horse, birds, and so forth (Warden, 1951; Bitterman, 1965) . Pearce (1987) also cites work by Russell (1979) in which the ratio of brain weight to body weight is used as an indicator of relative intelligence. The "cephalization index" of various species was listed as follows: human, .89; chimps, .30; dog, .14; wild pig, .12; cat, .12; horse, .10; sheep, .10; ox, .06; and rat, .05. These numbers would correlate fairly highly with the results of our survey and those of Banks and Flora (1977) . But it may not be too surprising, because people's perceptions are based on what is called the phylogenetic scale and that is highly related to brain size.
There are others, however, who claim that, based on considerable research, all vertebrates (except humans) are of equal intelligence (Macphail, 1982 , as quoted in Pearce, 1987 . And still others who suggest that "every animal is the smartest for the ecological niche in which it lives." (Bailey, 1986) . In a recent paper on farm animals, Nicol (1996) says, "It is not possible to compare intelligence between species or breeds without recognizing the contribution of differences in attention and motivation."
The study of animal behavior, and, in particular, domestic animal cognition, is still in its infancy. If nothing else, the results of the present study support the need for more research on the behavioral needs of farm animals and husbandry practices that are most appropriate to meet those needs.
Implications
The results of this limited study suggest that a majority of the biological and social scientists surveyed believe that animals have minds and mental capabilities. Therefore, the results don't agree with the claim by Rollin that most "respectable" scientists today don't agree with the statement by Darwin that "animal minds differ from human minds only in degree, not in kind." Furthermore, of the nonscientists surveyed, more than 80% perceive that animals have mental capacities. We believe that these results suggest that factors such as mental capacity should be important factors to consider in the development of new animal husbandry practices.
